s6y 21Shares Ethereum Staking ETF CORRESP

21Shares Ethereum Staking ETF CORRESP, filed Jun 21, 2024: A correspondence can be sent as a document with another submission type or can be sent as a separate submission.

VIA EDGAR

 

June 21, 2024

 

Division of Corporation Finance

 

Office of Crypto Assets
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549

 

Re:21Shares Core Ethereum ETF

Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement on Form S-1

Filed May 31, 2024

File No. 333- 274364

 

To Whom it May Concern:

 

On behalf of 21Shares Core Ethereum ETF (“Trust”), submitted herewith via the EDGAR system are the responses to the comments of the staff of the Office of Crypto Assets of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with respect to Amendment No. 3 to the Trust’s registration statement on Form S-1 filed on May 31, 2024 (“Registration Statement”). The Trust has considered your comments and has authorized us to make the responses and changes discussed below to the registration statement on its behalf. Below, we describe the changes that have been or will be incorporated into the Trust’s registration statement in response to the Staff of the SEC’s comments, provided in correspondence dated June 14, 2024, and provide any responses to or any supplemental explanations of such comments, as requested.

 

For your convenience, we have restated your comments below followed by our responses. Capitalized terms used but not defined in this letter have the meaning given to them in the Registration Statement. We will incorporate any changes referenced below into a future amendment to the Registration Statement.

 

Comment 1: When available, please disclose here the price per Share and aggregate price of the initial Seed Creation Baskets.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

The Sponsor served as the Seed Capital Investor to the Trust. On May 1, 2024, the Sponsor, in its capacity as Seed Capital Investor, subject to conditions, purchased Seed Creation Baskets comprising 2 Shares at a per-Share price of $50.00 as described in “Seed Capital Investor.” Total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of these Seed Creation Baskets were $100. Delivery of the Seed Creation Baskets was made May 1, 2024. These Seed Creation Baskets were redeemed for cash on or about June 17, 2024.

 

On June 18, 2024 (the “Seed Capital Purchase Date”), 21Shares US LLC , in its capacity as Seed Capital Investor, purchased the initial Seed Creation Baskets comprising 20,000 Shares (the “Initial Seed Creation Baskets”). In its capacity as the Seed Capital Investor, 21Shares US LLC has acted as a statutory underwriter in connection with this purchase. The total proceeds to the Trust from the sale of the Initial Seed Creation Baskets were $340,739. On June 18, 2024, the Trust purchased ether with the proceeds of the Initial Seed Creation Baskets by transacting with an Ether Counterparty to acquire ether on behalf of the Trust in exchange for cash provided by 21Shares US LLC in its capacity as Seed Capital Investor. Any ether acquired in connection with the Initial Seed Creation Baskets will be held by the Ether Custodian. The price of the Shares comprising the Initial Seed Creation Baskets will be determined as of the effective date of this Prospectus as described in this Prospectus, and such Shares could be sold at different prices if sold by the Seed Capital Investor at different times. It is anticipated that the Seed Capital Investor will redeem its Shares or sell its Shares to a third party in the weeks following the initial listing of Shares on the Exchange. The Trust will not receive any of the proceeds of the redemption of any Seed Creation Baskets by the Seed Capital Investor.

 

 

 

 

Comment 2: Please revise the cover page to state that the Trust will not participate in the proof-of-stake validation mechanism of the Ethereum network (i.e., the Trust will not “stake” its ether) to earn additional ether or seek other means of generating income from its ether holdings.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

The 21Shares Core Ethereum ETF (the “Trust”) is an exchange-traded fund that issues common shares of beneficial interest (the “Shares”) that trade on the Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”). The Trust’s investment objective is to seek to track the performance of ether, as measured by the performance of the CME CF Ether-Dollar Reference Rate – New York Variant (the “Index”), adjusted for the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities. CF Benchmarks Ltd. is the administrator for the Index (the “Index Provider”). The Index is designed to reflect the performance of ether in U.S. dollars. In seeking to achieve its investment objective, the Trust will hold ether and will value its Shares daily based on the Index. 21Shares US LLC (the “Sponsor”) is the sponsor of the Trust, CSC Delaware Trust Company (the “Trustee”) is the trustee of the Trust, and Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (“Coinbase Custody”) (the “Ether Custodian”) is the ether custodian for the Trust, and will hold all of the Trust’s ether on the Trust’s behalf.

 

Neither the Trust, nor the Sponsor, nor the Ether Custodian, nor any other person associated with the Trust will, directly or indirectly, employ any portion of the Trust’s assets in actions where any portion of the Trust’s ether becomes subject to the Ethereum proof-of-stake validation or is used to earn additional ether or generate income or other earnings (collectively, “Staking Activities”). Accordingly, the Trust will not derive any income from, or receive any form of staking rewards of any kind in connection with, or otherwise recognize any economic benefit from, any Staking Activity.

 

The Trust is an exchange-traded fund. Barring a liquidation or extraordinary circumstances, the Trust does not intend on purchasing or selling ether other than in connection with the creation and redemption of Shares. The Sponsor may also sell ether to pay certain expenses, which may be facilitated by the Prime Broker (as defined below) or any other prime brokers with whom the Trust contracts.

 

Comment 3: Please disclose here that the Trust is a passive investment vehicle that does not seek to generate returns beyond tracking the price of ether.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

The 21Shares Core Ethereum ETF (the “Trust”) is an exchange-traded fund that issues common shares of beneficial interest (the “Shares”) that trade on the Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”). The Trust is a passive investment vehicle that does not seek to generate returns beyond tracking the price of ether. This means the Sponsor does not speculatively sell ether at times when its price is high or speculatively acquire ether at low prices in the expectation of future price increases. It also means the Trust will not utilize leverage, derivatives or any similar arrangements in seeking to meet its investment objective. The Trust’s investment objective is to seek to track the performance of ether, as measured by the performance of the CME CF Ether-Dollar Reference Rate – New York Variant (the “Index”), adjusted for the Trust’s expenses and other liabilities. CF Benchmarks Ltd. is the administrator for the Index (the “Index Provider”). The Index is designed to reflect the performance of ether in U.S. dollars. In seeking to achieve its investment objective, the Trust will hold ether and will value its Shares daily based on the Index. 21Shares US LLC (the “Sponsor”) is the sponsor of the Trust, CSC Delaware Trust Company (the “Trustee”) is the trustee of the Trust, and Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (“Coinbase Custody”) (the “Ether Custodian”) is the ether custodian for the Trust, and will hold all of the Trust’s ether on the Trust’s behalf.

 

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Comment 4: Please revise your Prospectus Summary disclosure to clarify, if true, that with respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and in the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by your listing exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

If a modification is accepted by only a percentage of users and validators, a division will occur such that one network will run the pre-modification source code and the other network will run the modified source code. Such a division is known as a “fork.” A fork may be intentional such as the Ethereum “Merge.” The Merge represents the Ethereum Network’s shift from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake. This means that instead of being required to solve complex mathematical problems validators are required to stake ether. With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights (as defined below) or IR Virtual Currency (as defined below). In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules.

 

Comment 5: Please revise your Prospectus Summary to disclose that shareholders do not have voting rights under the Trust Agreement except in limited circumstances and briefly describe those circumstances here and in the Voting by Shareholders section.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

Other Risks

 

●The Exchange on which the Shares are listed may halt trading in the Trust’s Shares, which would adversely impact a Shareholder’s ability to sell Shares.

 

●The market infrastructure of the ether spot market could result in the absence of active Authorized Participants able to support the trading activity of the Trust, which would affect the liquidity of the Shares in the secondary market and make it difficult to dispose of Shares.

 

●Shareholders that are not Authorized Participants may only purchase or sell their Shares in secondary trading markets, and the conditions associated with trading in secondary markets may adversely affect Shareholders’ investment in the Shares.

 

●The Sponsor is leanly staffed and rely heavily on key personnel. The departure of any such key personnel could negatively impact the Trust’s operations and adversely impact an investment in the Trust.

 

●Shareholders do not have the rights enjoyed by investors in certain other vehicles and may be adversely affected by a lack of statutory rights and by limited voting and distribution rights. In certain circumstances, Shareholders may vote to appoint a successor Sponsor following the Voluntary Withdrawal of the Sponsor, or to continue the Trust in certain instances of dissolution of the Trust. Shareholders shall otherwise have no voting rights with respect to the Trust.

 

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Additionally, the section “Voting by Shareholders” will be revised as follows:

 

Owners of Shares do not generally have any voting rights. The Shares do not represent a traditional investment and are not similar to shares of a corporation operating a business enterprise with management and a board of directors. All Shares are of the same class with equal rights and privileges. By acquiring Shares, you are not acquiring the right to elect directors, to receive dividends, to vote on certain matters regarding the issuer of your Shares or to take other actions normally associated with the ownership of shares. The Shares do not entitle their holders to any conversion or pre-emptive rights or any redemption rights. In certain circumstances, Shareholders may vote to appoint a successor Sponsor following the Voluntary Withdrawal of the Sponsor, or to continue the Trust in certain instances of dissolution of the Trust. Shareholders shall otherwise have no voting rights with respect to the Trust.

 

Comment 6: We note your disclosure in your Creation and Redemption of Shares section beginning on page 91 regarding the Ether Counterparties. Please revise your Prospectus Summary to:

 

●Identify any Ether Trading Counterparties with whom the Sponsor has entered into an agreement. Clarify whether and to what extent any of the Ether Trading Counterparties are affiliated with or have any material relationships with any of the Authorized Participants. Alternatively, clarify, if true, that you are not able to identify any particular Ether Trading Counterparties at this time.

 

●Disclose, if known, the material terms of any agreement you have entered into, or will enter into with an Ether Trading Counterparty, including whether and to what extent there will be contractual obligations on the part of the Ether Trading Counterparty to participate in cash orders for creations or redemptions.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

The Trust will create Shares by receiving ether from an Ether Counterparty that is not the Authorized Participant, and the Trust––not the Authorized Participant––is responsible for selecting the Ether Counterparty to deliver the ether. Further, the Ether Counterparty will not be acting as an agent of the Authorized Participant with respect to the delivery of the ether to the Trust or acting at the direction of the Authorized Participant with respect to the delivery of the ether to the Trust.

 

The Trust will redeem Shares by delivering ether to an Ether Counterparty that is not the Authorized Participant and the Trust––not the Authorized Participant––is responsible for selecting the Ether Counterparty to receive the ether. Further, the Ether Counterparty will not be acting as an agent of the Authorized Participant with respect to the receipt of the ether from the Trust.

 

As of the date of this Prospectus, the Authorized Participants are Jane Street Capital, LLC Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc., ABN AMRO Clearing USA LLC and Virtu Americas LLC. As of the date of this Prospectus, the Prime Broker, Coinbase, Inc., and the Lender, Coinbase Credit, Inc., serve as Ether Counterparties. The Trust and/or Sponsor will bear the expense and risk of delivery and ownership of ether once such ether has been received by the Ether Custodian on behalf of the Trust and until transferred by the Ether Custodian on behalf of the Trust to the Ether Counterparty for conversion to cash.

 

All ether will be held by the Ether Custodian. The Transfer Agent (as defined below) will facilitate the processing of purchase and sale orders in Baskets to and from the Trust.

 

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Comment 7: Please add a risk factor describing the risks to Shareholders of the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Trust Agreement and state whether this provision applies to causes of action arising under the U.S. federal securities laws.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the following disclosure will be added:

 

The exclusive jurisdiction for certain types of actions and proceedings and waiver of trial by jury clauses set forth in the Trust Agreement may have the effect of limiting a Shareholder’s rights to bring legal action against the Trust and could limit a purchaser’s ability to obtain a favorable judicial forum for disputes with the Trust.

 

The Trust Agreement provides that the courts of the state of Delaware and any federal courts located in Wilmington, Delaware will be the exclusive jurisdiction for any claims, suits, actions or proceedings, provided that causes of actions for violations of the Exchange Act or the Securities Act will not be governed by the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Trust Agreement. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive certain claims that the courts of the state of Delaware and any federal courts located in Wilmington, Delaware is an inconvenient venue or is otherwise inappropriate. As such, Shareholder could be required to litigate a matter relating to the Trust in a Delaware court, even if that court may otherwise be inconvenient for the Shareholder.

 

The Trust Agreement also waives the right to trial by jury in any such claim, suit, action or proceeding, provided that causes of actions for violations of the Exchange Act or the Securities Act will not be governed by the waiver of the right to trial by jury provision of the Trust Agreement. If a lawsuit is brought against the Trust, it may be heard only by a judge or justice of the applicable trial court, which would be conducted according to different civil procedures and may result in different outcomes than a trial by jury would have, including results that could be less favorable to the plaintiffs in any such action. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive a right to a trial by jury which may limit a Shareholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with the Trust.

 

Section 22 of the Securities Act creates concurrent jurisdiction for federal and state courts over all suits brought to enforce any duty or liability created by the Securities Act or the rules and regulations thereunder. Investors cannot waive compliance with the federal securities laws and the rules and regulations thereunder. Further, there is uncertainty as to whether a court would enforce the exclusive forum jurisdiction for actions arising under the 1933 Act or Exchange Act.

 

Comment 8: Please add a risk factor addressing that at times, there has been a single entity that has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the total staked ether on the Ethereum network which poses centralization concerns and could permit the entity to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations. Address the concern that if such an entity, or a bad actor with a similar sized stake, were to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations, it could negatively affect the use and adoption of the Ethereum network, the value of ether, and thus the value of your shares. Additionally, please revise your “Ethereum is subject to a cybersecurity risk” discussion on page 32 to also address the possibility of a 33% attack and a 66% attack.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the following disclosure will be added:

 

Liquid staking applications pose risks associated with concentration of control.

 

Validators must deposit 32 ether to activate a unique validator key pair that is used to sign block proposals and attestations on behalf of its stake (i.e., vote on its view of the chain). For every 32 ether deposit that is staked, a unique validator key pair is generated. An application built on the Ethereum network, or a single node operator, can manage many validator key pairs. For example, Lido, an application that provides a so-called “liquid staking” solution which permits holders of ether to deposit them with Lido, which stakes the ether while issuing the holder a transferrable token, is reported by some sources to have or have had up to 275,000 validator key pairs (each representing 32 staked ether) divided across over 30 node operators. At times, Lido has reportedly controlled around or in excess of 33% of the total staked ether on the Ethereum network. While it is widely believed that Lido has little incentive to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations using its reported 33% stake, since doing so would likely cause its entire stake to be slashed and thus lost (assuming good actors unaffiliated with Lido controlled the remainder), and also because Lido is believed to not control most of the third party node operators where its ether is staked, and finally since the occurrence of such manipulation of the Ethereum network’s consensus process by Lido or any other actor would likely cause ether to lose substantial value (which would obviously hurt Lido economically), it nevertheless poses risks associated with such a concentration of control (including centralization concerns) . If Lido, or a bad actor with a similar sized stake, were to attempt to interfere with transaction finality or block confirmations, it could negatively affect the use and adoption of the Ethereum network, the value of ether, and thus the value of the Shares.

 

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Additionally, the section “Ethereum is subject to cybersecurity risks” will be revised as follows:

 

Ethereum is subject to cybersecurity risks, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate.

 

Users of ether, and therefore investors in Ethereum-related investment products such as the Trust, are exposed to an elevated risk of fraud and loss, including, but not limited to, through cyber-attacks. Ethereum can be stolen, and ether stored in a digital wallet, accessible via private key, can be compromised. While digital wallets do not store or contain the actual ether, they store public and private keys, which are used as an address for receiving ether or for spending the ether, with both forms of transactions recorded on the public immutable ledger, the blockchain. By using the private key, a person is able to spend ether, effectively sending it away from the account and recording that transaction on the blockchain. If a private key is compromised, ether associated with that specific public key may be stolen. Unlike traditional banking transactions, once a transaction has been added to the blockchain, it cannot be reversed. Several exchanges specializing in sales of ether, for example, have already had their operations impacted by cyber-attacks.

 

Thefts and cyber-attacks can have a negative impact on the reputation, market price, value, or liquidity of ether. Through investment in the Trust, investors would be indirectly exposed to the risk and potential impact of a cyber-attack. A loss associated with cyberattack, including a total loss, is possible. While the Sponsor and the Ether Custodian have taken reasonable measures to prevent a theft or hacking of the Trust’s ether holdings, such an event cannot be fully excluded from the Trust’s overall market exposure, and the losses associated with such an event would be borne by investors.

 

Digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, are subject to control by entities that capture a significant amount of the network’s active validator nodes or a significant number of developers important for the operation and maintenance of such digital asset network. Following the Merge and the switch to proof-of-stake validation, the Ethereum network is currently vulnerable to several types of attacks including:

 

●“>33% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators were to gain control of more than 33% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor could temporarily impede or delay block confirmation or even cause a temporary fork in the blockchain.

 

●“>50% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 50% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor would be able to gain full control of the Ethereum network and the ability to manipulate the blockchain on a forward-looking basis, including censoring transactions following the achievement of threshold, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, while the attacker maintains the threshold. In theory, the minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively.

 

●“>66% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked ETH on the Ethereum network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the blockchain, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent block propagation, both on a forward- and backward-looking basis. The attacker could unilaterally finalize their preferred chain without the votes of any other stakers, and could also reverse past finalized blocks. The attacker can simply vote for their preferred fork and then finalize it, simply because they can vote with a dishonest supermajority.

 

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At 50% of the staked ether, a mischievous group of validators could theoretically split the chain into two equally sized forks and then simply use their entire 50% stake to vote contrarily to the honest validator set, thereby maintaining the two forks and preventing finality.

 

However, if the majority of the staked ether dedicated to validating transactions on the Ethereum network is controlled by a bad actor (often referred to as a “51% attack”), it may be able to alter the Ethereum Blockchain on which the Ethereum network and ether transactions rely. At greater than 50% of the total stake, the attacker could dominate the fork choice algorithm. In this case, the attacker would be able to attest with the majority vote. This could occur if the bad actor were to construct fraudulent blocks or prevent certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. It could be possible for the malicious actor to control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions, though it could not generate new ether or transactions. Further, a bad actor could “double-spend” its own ether (i.e., spend the same ether in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control. Reversing any changes made to the Ethereum Blockchain may be impossible. Further, a malicious actor could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum network. If a bad actor gains control of a majority of the processing power on the Ethereum network, or the feasibility of such an occurrence increases, there may be a negative effect on an investment in the Trust.

 

Other digital asset networks have been subject to malicious activity achieved through control of over 50% of the processing power on the network. Any similar attack on the Ethereum network could negatively impact the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

 

A 51% attack is more likely to happen in the context of digital assets with smaller market capitalizations due to the reduced computing power threshold required to control a majority of a given network. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible, albeit computationally expensive, to mount a similar 51% attack on Ethereum or other digital assets with large market capitalization. If the feasibility of a bad actor gaining control of the processing power on the Ethereum network increases, there may be a negative effect on an investment in the Trust.

 

A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Ethereum network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. To the extent that users and miners accept amendments to the source code proposed by the controlled core developer, other core developers do not counter such amendments, and such amendments enable the malicious exploitation of the Ethereum network, the risk that a malicious actor may be able to obtain control of the Ethereum network in this manner exists, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

 

To the extent that the Ethereum ecosystem, including the core developers and the administrators of validator pools, does not act to ensure greater decentralization, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Ethereum network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

 

If any of these exploitations or attacks occur, it could result in a loss of public confidence in Ethereum and a decline in the value of ether and, as a result, adversely impact an investment in the Shares.

 

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Comment 9: Please clarify in the second paragraph, as you do on page 81, that the insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian is shared among all the Ether Custodian’s customers and is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian. Similarly revise the Summary discussion on pages 6 and 7.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

While the Ether Custodian has advised the Sponsor that it has insurance coverage up to $320 million that covers losses of the digital assets it custodies on behalf of its clients, including the Trust’s ether, resulting from theft, Shareholders cannot be assured that the Ether Custodian will maintain adequate insurance, that such coverage will cover losses with respect to the Trust’s ether, or that sufficient insurance proceeds will be available to cover the Trust’s losses in full. The Ether Custodian’s insurance may not cover the type of losses experienced by the Trust. Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the Ether Custodian, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. In addition, the ether insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust. While the Ether Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the Ether Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. The insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian is shared among all of the Ether Custodian’s customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian, and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses.

 

Further, the Summary discussion on page 6 will be revised as follows:

 

Although the Ether Custodian carries insurance, the Ether Custodian’s insurance does not cover any loss in value to ether and only covers losses caused by certain events such as fraud or theft and, in such covered events, it is unlikely the insurance would cover the full amount of any losses incurred by the Trust. The insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian is shared among all of the Ether Custodian’s customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian, and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses.

 

Additionally, the Summary discussion on page 7 will be revised as follows:

 

The Ether Custodian provides insured safekeeping of digital assets using a multi-layer cold storage security platform designed to provide offline security of the digital assets held by the Ether Custodian. The Ether Custodian has insurance coverage as a subsidiary under its parent company, Coinbase Global, Inc., which procures fidelity (e.g. crime) insurance to protect the organization from risks such as theft of funds. Specifically, the fidelity program provides coverage for the theft of funds held in hot or cold storage. The insurance program is provided by a syndicate of industry-leading insurers. The insurance program does not cover, insure or guarantee the performance of the Trust. The Ether Custodian is not FDIC-insured. The insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian is shared among all of the Ether Custodian’s customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian, and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses.

 

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Comment 10: Please add a separately captioned subsection discussing the following related to ether and the Ethereum network:

 

●Limitations on the supply of ether

 

●Quantify the amount of ether outstanding and the amount of ether issued and burned as of a recent date.

 

●An expanded discussion of modifications to the Ethereum protocol.

 

●An updated discussion of recent planned forks, including “Dencun” and EIP 4844.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the following disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

Limits on ether supply.

 

Ether is the second largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization behind bitcoin. As of May 20, 2024, ether had a total market capitalization of approximately $434.3 billion and represented approximately 16% of the entire digital asset market.

 

The rate at which new ether are issued and put into circulation is expected to vary. The Ethereum network has no formal cap on the total supply of ether. As of the date of this prospectus, the Ethereum network has a total outstanding supply of approximately 120.2M ether. The Ethereum network does, however, feature several mechanisms that, individually and in aggregate, have the effect of limiting the total supply of ether outstanding. These mechanisms are sometimes referred to collectively as the “Ethereum Triple Halving.”

 

As a result of the Merge, where the Ethereum network moved from a proof-of-work to a proof-of-stake mechanism under Ethereum 2.0, the rate of issuance is greatly reduced. Under proof-of-work, miners expend computational resources to compete to validate transactions and are rewarded coins in proportion to the amount of computational resources expended, which resulted in comparably more new tokens rewarded. By contrast, under proof-of-stake, validators risk or “stake” coins to compete to be randomly selected to validate transactions and are rewarded coins in proportion to the amount of coins staked, which results in comparably fewer new tokens rewarded. Following the Merge, approximately 1,700 ether are issued per day, though the issuance rate varies based on the number of validators on the network. As of May 22, 2024, approximately 1,400 ether were issued in the previous day. The issuance rate varies based on the number of validators on the network and other factors. As of May 22, 2024, approximately 1,100 ether were burned in the previous day.

 

The change from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake also limits the total supply of ether in circulation by effectively locking staked, certain period of time, making it temporarily unavailable for trading or selling.

 

Additionally, the supply of ether is limited as a result of the deflationary gas fee burning mechanism introduced by EIP 1559 in August 2021 to reform the Ethereum gas fee market. EIP 1559 split of fees into two components: the base fee (calculated depending on the network activity involved) and the tip. When ether is used to pay the base fee, it is removed from circulation, or “burnt,” and the tip is paid to validators. As a result of this fee burning mechanism, the overall supply of ether decreases as more ether are destroyed through the fee burn. Since the fee burning depends on the network activity, the more the transactions on the Ethereum network, the more ether is burned and the lower the issuance. This also has the effect of reducing the incentives for validators to validate transactions with higher gas fees, since those validators would only receive the tip and not base fees. On occasion, the ether supply has been deflationary over a 24 hour period as a result of the burn mechanism.

 

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Additionally, the following disclosure will be added:

 

A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

 

The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks (referred to as “planned forksˮ because they take place through a formal process).

 

In the case of planned forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code called EIPs. Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source code for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, and ultimately a critical mass of validators and users - such as dApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of dApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum blockchain or Ethereum network - must support the shift, or the upgrades will lack adoption.

 

Typically in the case of a planned fork, once the EIPs are formally introduced by being merged into the EIP repository on GitHub, a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change ordinarily follows. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. A modification of the Ethereum network’s source code is only effective with respect to the Ethereum nodes that download it and modify their Ethereum Clients accordingly, and in practice such decisions are heavily influenced by the preferences of validators and users. Typically, after a modification is introduced and if a sufficiently broad critical mass of users and validators support the modification and nodes download the modification into their individual Ethereum Clients, the change is implemented and the Ethereum network continues to operate uninterrupted, assuming there are no software issues (e.g., bugs, outages, etc). However, if less than a sufficiently broad critical mass (in practice, amounting to a substantial majority) of users and validators support the proposed modification and nodes refuse to download the modification to their Ethereum Clients, and the modification is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum blockchain or network or the Ethereum Clients of nodes prior to their modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network, with one group of nodes running the pre-modified software, with users and validators continuing to use the pre-modified software, while the other group would adopt and run the modified software. The effect of such a hard fork would be the existence of two versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel on separate networks using separate blockchain ledgers, yet lacking interchangeability. In practice, in a hard fork, the two networks would compete with each other for developers, node operators, users, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants, and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed 50% of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack.

 

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A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. A fork could also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Alternatively, as with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. If a fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares.

 

On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, making them more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.

 

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In September 2022, the Ethereum network transitioned to a proof-of-stake consensus model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum network occurred, as a small number of Ethereum validators and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network, which is not backwards-compatible with the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain, is considered a forked branch and was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.” To the extent significant developer talent, users or validators abandon the Ethereum Layer 1 network and adopt the Ethereum Proof-of-Work blockchain instead, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected.

 

As illustrated by Dencun and the Merge, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub-stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain mainnet for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain testnet following the Merge). Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

 

Forks may also occur as a digital asset network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum underwent a hard fork between the Layer 1 Ethereum network and a new digital asset running on a “forked” branch of the network, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach. In June 2016, an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ether held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, and after a contentious debate, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a hard fork that effectively reversed the hack, and this network constitutes the Layer 1 Ethereum network. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic”, which is not backwards-compatible with the Layer 1 Ethereum network and is considered a forked branch, with the native digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. Following the July 2016 hard fork between the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, new security concerns surfaced. Replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum exchanges through at least October 2016. An Ethereum exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018, and security concerns could similarly surface in connection with future hard forks.

 

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An unplanned fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of Ethereum Client software that nodes run and use to access the Ethereum network. For example, such an unplanned fork reportedly occurred in the Go-Ethereum (“Geth”) client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network and whose developers are financially supported by the Ethereum Foundation. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time, such as Besu, OpenEthereum, and Nethermind), and a patch was released that all nodes using the Geth client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all nodes using Geth did so, resulting with the non-patched Geth nodes temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum blockchain than the patched Geth nodes and nodes using other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum blockchain, causing the nodes using the non-patched Geth version to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the nodes on the Ethereum blockchain, interrupting the non-patch Geth nodes’ access to the Ethereum network. For example, Infura, which is a node operator that provides services to major Ethereum smart contracts, wallet software providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, and other market participants, reportedly ran numerous nodes using the Geth client. Infura’s Geth client-running nodes reportedly used the outdated, non-patched Geth version initially, which is said to have caused those nodes to be on the minority blockchain, impacting transaction execution, validation, and recording on the main Layer 1 Ethereum network for Infura’s customers - such as Ethereum-based smart contracts, wallet providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, etc. - until Infura was able to apply the software update released by the Geth client developers to Infura’s nodes that use Geth as their Ethereum Client. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all nodes using the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth nodes, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network, including for Infura and its customers.

 

In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to nodes, users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future unplanned fork, a substantial number of nodes, users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, following the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run two Ethereum Clients, i.e., an Execution Client and a Consensus Client paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate effectively with each other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate effectively with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unplanned fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ether to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares.

 

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Protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase, but results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016.

 

Comment 11: Please disclose what policies or procedures you have in place if the Index becomes unavailable or if the Sponsor determines that the Index does not reflect an accurate ether price.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

The Administrator calculates the NAV of the Trust once each Exchange trading day. The NAV for a normal trading day will be released after 4:00 p.m. ET. Trading during the core trading session on the Exchange typically closes at 4:00 p.m. ET. However, NAVs are not officially struck until later in the day (often by 5:30 p.m. ET and almost always by 8:00 p.m. EST). The pause between 4:00 p.m. ET and 5:30 p.m. ET (or later) provides an opportunity for the Administrator to algorithmically detect, flag, investigate, and correct unusual pricing should it occur. Any such correction could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If the Index is not available, or if the Sponsor determines in good faith that the Index does not reflect an accurate ether price, then the Administrator will determine NAV by reference to the Trust’s principal market. There are no predefined criteria to make a good faith assessment as to which of the rules the Sponsor will apply, and the Sponsor may make this determination in its sole discretion.

 

In addition, in order to provide updated information relating to the Trust for use by Shareholders and market professionals, Solactive will calculate and disseminate throughout the core trading session on each trading day an updated intraday indicative value (“IIV”). The IIV will be calculated by using the prior day’s closing NAV as a base and updating that value during the trading day based off of more recent ether pricing information to reflect any changes in the value of the Trust’s underlying assets and, therefore, the Trust’s NAV.

 

The Trust is subject to the risk that the Administrator may calculate the Index in a manner that ultimately inaccurately reflects the price of ether. To the extent that the NAV, Principal Market NAV, the Index, the Administrator’s or the Sponsor’s other valuation methodology are incorrectly calculated, neither the Sponsor, the Administrator nor the Trustee will be liable for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the Index or other valuation method used to calculate the NAV and Principal Market NAV of the Trust. Any such change in the Index or other valuation method could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust.

 

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Comment 12: Please clarify how you will inform Shareholders if the Exchange receives regulatory approval and the Sponsor chooses to allow creations and redemptions via in-kind transactions.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and the impacted disclosure will be revised as follows:

 

In the future, the Trust may also permit Authorized Participants (or third parties for which the Authorized Participant is acting on behalf) to create and redeem Shares via in-kind transactions, subject to receiving regulatory approval. The timing of applicable regulatory approval is unknown and there is no guarantee that such regulatory approval will be received. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that Authorized Participants (or third parties for which the Authorized Participant is acting on behalf) would be permitted to create or redeem Shares via in-kind transactions with the Trust in the future. If such regulatory approval is received, and if the Sponsor chooses to allow in-kind creations and redemptions, the Trust will notify the owners of the beneficial interests of Shares in a prospectus supplement, in its periodic Exchange Act reports and on the Trust’s website.

 

Comment 13: You state that the Sponsor may have difficulty liquidating the Trust’s positions because of

“an unanticipated delay in the liquidation of a position in an over-the-counter contract.” Please describe the circumstances in which the Trust would have a position in an over-the counter contract. In this regard, we note your disclosure that the Prime Broker exchanges the Trust’s ether for cash and the Trust’s cash for ether in connection with creations, redemptions and paying the Trust’s expenses.

 

Response: The Trust has incorporated this comment and this disclosure will be removed. The Trust confirms it will not hold any positions in an over-the-counter contract.

 

***

 

Should members of the Staff have any questions or comments concerning this letter, please call the undersigned at 212-698-3526.

 

Sincerely,  
   
/s/ Allison M. Fumai  
Allison M. Fumai, Esq.  
Dechert LLP  

 

 

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